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Smart Mixes and the Challenge of Complexity
Lessons from Global Climate Governance
Philipp Pattberg and Oscar Widerberg*
3.1 introduction
Addressing global environmental challenges in the twenty-first century, from bio-
diversity loss to climate change, requires more than intergovernmental agreements.
As has been widely observed, command-and-control instruments have been comple-
mented by a variety of new governance instruments across different issue areas and
sectors.1 The resulting institutional architecture of global governance has been
described using concepts such as ‘fragmegration’,2 ‘assemblages’,3 ‘bricolage’4 or
‘new medievalism’5 to make sense of the seeming complexity of world politics. At
the level of concrete institutional arrangements and governance instruments,
scholars have noted (international) ‘regime complexity’,6 defined as ‘the presence
of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not
hierarchically ordered’.7 As a consequence of increased institutional density and
overlap, authors have theorised the ‘fragmentation of global governance architec-
tures’8 and the emergence of related ‘regime complexes’.9 However, while complex-
ity is often assumed and hypothesised, few authors have attempted to conceptualise
and measure complexity from the perspective of complexity theory. This seems
particularly relevant when taking into account the idea of ‘smart mixes’ and ‘smart
* The authors also acknowledge financial support from the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (CONNECT project, grant number 016.125.330).
1 Pattberg and Stripple (2008); Jordan et al. (2018).
2 Rosenau (1990).
3 DeLanda (2006); Sassen (2006).
4 Mittelman (2013).
5 Friedrichs (2001).
6 Drezner (2008); Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery (2009); Orsini, Morin & Young (2013).
7 Alter & Meunier (2009).
8 Biermann et al. (2009).
9 Raustiala & Victor (2004); Keohane & Victor (2011).
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regulation’. These concepts describe an ideal situation in which we can combine
various regulatory and governance instruments, both public and private and both
international and local, into sophisticated mixes of complementary instruments and
actors, tailored to the specific needs of the situation. However, does rational mixing
and orchestrating work in situations where the parts of the system (the regulations,
policies, institutions) interact in a non-linear, non-additive way to produce unex-
pected outcomes?
In this chapter, we analyse in what respects the governance architecture of
climate change has properties of a complex system. We argue that potential emer-
gent behaviour of complex climate governance, i.e. unforeseen impacts and unin-
tended consequences, might stand in the way of attempts to better manage and
orchestrate the many parallel initiatives that have sprung up in recent years next to
the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In
other words, we critically engage with the concept of smart mixes from a complexity
perspective. Rather than arguing that the idea of smart mixes and complex systems
do not go together, we think it more useful to explore how a more experimental
mode of governance might be utilised to improve the ‘smartness’ of existing insti-
tutional mixes at the global level. This chapter is organised as follows: in Section 3.2,
we provide a short introduction to complexity theory and the notion of complex
systems. We also operationalise the concept of a complex system for researching the
global climate change governance architecture. Section 3.3 then provides an empir-
ical illustration of our claim that the climate change governance architecture has
some properties of complex systems. Finally, in Section 3.4 we conclude with
outlining some lessons learned and developing a research program on governance
complexity and smart mixes for the future.
3.2 complexity theory, complex systems and how
to study climate change governance
This section introduces basic ideas of complexity theory, elaborates further on the
properties of complex systems and suggests a way to test whether global climate
change governance has properties of a complex system.
3.2.1 Complexity Theory and Complex Systems
Next to the widely applied term complexity science, scholars use complexity theory to
refer to a number of assumptions about and perspectives on complexity and complex
systems. It is important to note that no general theory of complexity has so far
emerged that would be able to explain all classes of complex phenomena, such as
hurricanes, financial crises, cities, organisational ecologies and regime complexes.
Complexity theory should therefore be understood less as a unified explanatory
theory and more as an ontologically founded framework of analysis.
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In this chapter, we employ complexity theory to analyse those phenomena that
arise from and are visible in complex systems. But what are complex systems?
A straightforward way to understand them (if such a thing exists in the context of
complexity) is to say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. As a result of
systemic interactions (to quote Kavalski), ‘alterations occur whose outcomes are
wholly unexpected and nearly impossible to predict’. 10 A complex system approach
considers actions of agents (e.g. organisations/members to governance institutions)
that produce macro-level phenomena by aggregation. Sometimes complex systems
create complexity. For example, the global financial system is a complex system that
has parts that are predictable while other parts have emergent properties, i.e.
properties that do not fully derive from the simple sum of all individual parts.
Bicycles and pendulums are examples of simple systems; the immune system and
ecosystems are examples of complex systems.
We follow Byrne and Callaghan11 and Bousquet and Curtis12 in suggesting that
most theorists of complexity agree upon the following concepts as key ingredients to
complexity theory: non-linearity, emergence, self-organisation and open systems.
In linear systems, when the value of a causal element changes, we can predict the
change in the value of the dependent element. The changes in the latter are
proportional to the changes in the former. As Byrne and Callaghan note, ‘Linearity
is foundational to “Newtonian” science by which we mean scientific accounts in
which we can describe a current state in terms of values of parameters and have a
covering law, a universal/nomothetic specification, which describes how the state
will change if values in the parameters change’. 13 Non-linear systems do not satisfy
the superposition principle by which outputs are proportional to inputs. In other
words, in non-linear systems, effects emerge that are disproportionate to the changes
in the input and thereby might be qualified as ‘surprising’ and hard-to-predict.
What follows from non-linear dynamics is that often we can speak of emergent
properties and phenomena that are qualitatively different from those of the individ-
ual units/agents that are aggregated (think of the difference between water mol-
ecules/water and brain cells/consciousness). Emergent properties are defined as the
‘intricate intertwining or interconnectivity of elements within a system, and between
a system and its environment’.14 A good example is a group of commuters competing
for space on a road and causing a traffic jam. While the individual commuter is
motivated by a simplistic goal, to get home as soon as possible, the aggregate
phenomenon, a traffic jam, is hard to predict, evolve and manage. It represents, in
other words, an emergent phenomenon.15
10 Kavalski (2007), at 437.
11 Byrne & Callaghan (2013), at 8.
12 Bousquet & Curtis (2011).
13 Byrne & Callaghan (2013), at 18.
14 Mitleton-Kelly (2000).
15 See Johnson (2009).
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Different from the observed emergent phenomenon, self-organisation is a process
‘by which the autonomous interaction of individual entities results in the bottom-up
emergence of complex systems’.16 That means that emergent phenomena do not
result from the operation of an ‘invisible hand’, central agency or intelligent
designer. Applied to the field of governance studies, this implies that central steering
of entire governance systems is difficult to observe in reality.
Finally, complex systems are usually open systems, i.e. they have porous borders
and exchange information and energy with their environments. It is, however, an
empirical question how open they are.17 The assumption of openness contradicts
most analysts of political systems, who posit that these are closed: ‘disturbances are
temporary and the system tends to return to equilibrium’.18According to Walzian
Structural Realism, for example, the international system does not change in its
fundamental features as anarchy and sovereignty construct the conditions of a closed
system. Similar assumptions about closed systems can be found in Luhmann’s
Modern Systems Theory.
In sum, complexity theory assumes that non-linear relationships will dominate
complex systems, that equilibrium is not automatically a preferred system state, that
self-organisation and emergence are defining properties of complex systems and
that, consequently, reductionist approaches are ill-suited for analysing many real-
world phenomena.19
3.2.2 How to Study Climate Governance as a Complex System
To study global climate governance from a complexity perspective, we need appro-
priate methodologies. Social network analysis provides a particularly suitable
approach because non-linearity is a key characteristic of complex systems, and
networks are a perfect embodiment of non-linearity. In the words of Capra:
The first and most obvious property of any network is its non-linearity — it goes in
all directions. Thus the relationships in a network pattern are non-linear relation-
ships. In particular, an influence, or message, may travel along a cyclical path,
which may become a feedback loop. The concept of feedback is intimately
connected with the network pattern. 20
What follows from this is that network theories and relational ontologies21 will
feature prominently as an analytical tool to unravel complex systems.22 While
16 Bousquet & Curtis (2011), at 47.
17 Singer (1971), at 13.
18 Harrison & Singer (2006), at 47.
19 Kavalski (2007); see also Rosenau (2003).
20 Capra (1996), at 82.
21 On the notions of relational ontologies and relational thinking in sociology, see Emirbayer
(1997).
22 Watts & Strogatz (1998).
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networks as a specific mode of organisation (opposed to markets and hierarchies)
have been recognised in International Relations and global governance scholar-
ship for a while,23 network analysis as a formal method of inquiry has been applied
less frequently. This is rather regrettable, as network analysis allows for fine-
grained but robust measurements of structure (e.g. interactions among institutions
in the climate change regime complex). Network analysis is grounded in three
principles that make it an ideal approach within complexity science:24 first,
nodes (i.e. agents) are behaviourally interdependent; second, ties between nodes
can be channels for resource exchange (material and non-material); and third,
repeated and persistent patterns of interaction among nodes create structures that
exert influence on the behaviour of agents. We will utilise these insights in our
application of network analysis to the climate change governance architecture in
Section 3.3.
But how can we empirically verify whether the institutional structure visible
in the climate governance architecture25 constitutes a complex system?
Following Page,26 we focus on four properties of complex systems with the
potential to generate complexity. First, complex systems consist of diverse
entities; second, the entities interact in an interaction structure; and third, the
behaviour of the entities in the system is interdependent (meaning that they
influence each other). We add the criterion of open system as a fourth property,
arguing that climate change as a governance system should be open to its
environment for our assumption about climate change as a complex system to
hold. Adaptation and learning are sometimes mentioned as an additional char-
acteristic; however, due to data limitations, we do not analyse learning effects in
this chapter.
In sum, we have argued in this section that complexity theory provides a
potentially innovative perspective on global governance in that it allows to study
governance systems (aggregations of regulations, institutions, rules, norms,
decision-making procedures) as complex systems. Complexity – with its key attri-
butes non-linearity, emergence, self-organisation and open systems – is a possible
state of complex systems. Section 3.3 illustrates our claim that the climate change
governance architecture,27 also referred to as the regime complex for climate
change,28 has attributes of a complex system and should therefore analytically be
treated as such.
23 An example is Keck and Sikkink’s concept of transnational activist networks; see Keck &
Sikking (1998).
24 Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery (2009), at 562.
25 See governance triangle in Figure 3.1.
26 Page (2015), at 24–25.
27 Biermann et al. (2009).
28 Keohane & Victor (2011).
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3.3 analysing global climate governance as a
complex system
The complexity of complex systems derives from the relationships among constitu-
ent parts, not from the parts themselves. In other words, complex systems are
complex because of the interactions of their components and not because of
additive effects of all parts. It is therefore not sufficient to map all governance
institutions in the climate change regime complex in order to deduce outcomes;
in fact, interactions among constituent parts, including feedback loops and non-
linearity, result in system-wide, emergent properties. The implications for the idea of
‘smart mixes’ is potentially far-reaching. If the interaction of the many policies,
governance arrangements and institutions operating within an issue area (as possibly
between issue areas as well) produces unintended and unforeseeable effects, this
might severely limit the ability of actors to engage in a rational design of broader
governance architectures.
This section presents an empirical illustration of global governance as a complex
system using climate change as an issue area for the case, where increasing insti-
tutional density has long been observed and analysed under headings such as
‘interplay’29 and ‘fragmentation’.30 Still, research has only recently started to map
and partially measure the overall institutional structure of global governance, i.e. the
clusters of norms, principles, regimes and other institutions generally referred to as
the governance architecture of an issue area. In the words of Biermann and col-
leagues: ‘Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical
accounts of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions
to solve particular governance challenges’. 31 An important step towards analysing
the macro-level of governance institutions in world politics was Raustiala and
Victor’s conceptualisation of regime complexes as ‘an array of partially overlapping
and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area’. 32 While firmly
rooted in a state-based, international ontology, their interest was in understanding
institutionalisation beyond single regimes and clearly demarcated legal boundaries.
Keohane and Victor33 applied the regime complex conceptualization to climate
governance, also with a focus on international cooperation.34
29 Oberthür & Stokke (2011).
30 Biermann et al. (2009).
31 Biermann et al. (2009), at 14.
32 Raustiala & Victor (2004), at 279.
33 Keohane & Victor (2011).
34 For an alternative conceptualisation, see Orsini, Morin & Young (2013), at 29: ‘a network of
three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter, exhibit overlap-
ping membership, and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as
potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively’.
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Building on, inter alia, Young’s early work on institutional linkages,35 the regime
complex literature problematises and nuances our understanding of structure in
global governance, situating regimes on a continuum, ranging from fully integrated
institutions regulated via top-down authority, to nested regimes (semi-hierarchical),
and collections of loosely coupled institutions (regime complexes) to fragmented
institutional structures that lack coordination and linkages among constituent parts.
Consequently, scholars have suggested that regime complexes are inherently com-
plex and therefore justify speaking of regime complexity.36 However, system-wide
complexity of governance architectures has been more often assumed than meas-
ured. Improving the mapping of institutional diversity might provide further empir-
ical insights into the structure of global governance, in particular understanding its
characteristics as a complex system.
When mapping the wide array of institutional forms in global climate govern-
ance, Abbott employs a ‘governance triangle’.37 Institutions are situated in the
governance triangle depending on the identity of their constituent actors – State,
Firm or Civil Society Organisation (CSO) – or combinations thereof.38 The place-
ment of an institution is determined by judging each actor group’s approximate
‘share’ in the governance of the scheme: in principle, the State category includes
individual states and collections of states or international organisations (IOs) along
with public bodies below the level of central states, e.g. cities and regions. Similarly,
the Firm category includes individual business firms, groups of firms and industry
associations; and ultimately, the CSO category includes individual CSOs as well as
CSO coalitions and networks. All three actor groups are defined broadly, so that
between them they encompass virtually all possible participants in transnational
governance. The triangle is further divided into seven zones, which represent the
major combinations of actor types. Institutions in the vertex zones (1–3) are domin-
ated by a single type of actor; those in the quadrilateral zones (4–6) involve two types
of actors; and those in the central zone (7) involve actors of all three types. Addition-
ally, the two dashed horizontal lines divide the triangle into three ‘tiers’, defined by
the nature of government involvement – state-led (public institutions are dominant),
private-led (Firms and CSO are dominant), and hybrid (government bodies share
governance with firms and/or CSO in public-private partnerships).
Figure 3.1 shows an updated and altered version of Abbott and Snidal’s govern-
ance triangle applied to global climate governance, including a total of eighty-nine
international and transnational governance institutions (updated as of January 2017).
Criteria for inclusion in our dataset (1) have been international or transnational, (2)
display intentionality to steer the behaviour of their members, (3) explicitly mention
35 Young (1996).
36 Orsini, Morin & Young (2013).
37 See Abbott (2012); Abbott & Snidal (2009); Abbott & Snidal (2010).
38 Abbott & Snidal (2009).
Smart Mixes and the Challenge of Complexity 55
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108653183.003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Vrije Universiteit, on 10 May 2021 at 14:24:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
a common governance goal, and (4) have identifiable governance functions (for
further information on selection process, see the technical report by Widerberg,
Pattberg, and Kristensen).39 In the following text, each of the four properties
discussed in Section 3.2.2 is analysed using data from the CONNECT-project as
outlined previously.
3.3.1 Diversity
Complex systems consist of diverse entities (or agents in the parlance of agent-based
modelling). Analysing a complex system thus requires a description of this diversity.
Mapping the climate regime complex using the heuristic of a governance triangle
(see Figure 3.1) reveals seven different zones of interaction determined by the type of
actors involved: public actors (e.g. national or local governments); for-profit actors
(e.g. corporations); and non-profit actors (e.g. non-governmental organisations).
Within these three different broad actor types, we find both diversity (distinct types)
figure 3.1 : Global climate governance triangle
(Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016; based on Abbott and Snidal 2009; Abbott 2012).
39 Widerberg, Pattberg & Kristensen (2016).
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and variation (distinctions within a type).40 In terms of member types, the
CONNECT-dataset identifies about 10,750 different organizations with different
degree of governing functions in the institutions. These can further be divided across
six categories: cities (81 per cent), companies (14 per cent), NGOs (3 per cent) and
States (2 per cent). The distribution of members across institutions also differs
widely, from institutions with one member to those with over 6,000 members. With
an average of 142 members, a median of 25 members per institution, and a standard-
deviation of 670, however, we observe that while the vast majority of institutions
have fewer than 100 members, their size varies considerably. Moreover, institutions
in our dataset perform a wide range of functions across a diverse set of themes. We
have identified twelve themes: Carbon pricing and trading, CCS, Climate finance,
Energy access, Energy efficiency, Forest mitigation (general), MRV, Non-CO
2
GHGs, Renewable energy, Sectoral (e.g. steel, transport, aviation and lighting)
and Urban climate action. This finding corroborates previous research by (for
example) Bulkeley and colleagues,41 who study sixty transnational climate govern-
ance institutions and identify twenty-one different climate related themes. Hence,
we can observe large diversity across the institutions. Zooming in on individual
institutions, we also find large variation. For instance, consider city size in the
Covenant of Mayors, which, with over 6,000 members, is by far the largest insti-
tution in the CONNECT dataset. The distribution ranges from villages such as
Isuerre, located in northern Spain, with a population of fewer than 40, to cities such
as London, with its population of nearly 8 million. Moreover, the median popula-
tion of 5,476 in cities that are members of the Covenant of Mayors, and the standard-
deviation of over 170,000 (indicating a highly positively skewed distribution) are
both similar to the distribution of size of institutions in terms of members.
In sum, the global climate governance regime complex consists of a highly diverse
set of institutions and organisations in terms of type, size and thematic focus. For
example, even considering only type and theme of institutions generates eighty-four
possible institutional types,42 indicating that the system fulfils the attribute of ‘diver-
sity’. Interestingly, the distributions in terms of size in each of the preceding cases are
positively skewed. According to Page,43 these patterns are common in complex
systems and allow for testing several explanatory models for this observation. For
instance, perhaps we can explain the characteristics of the Covenant of Mayors by a
‘preferential attachment’model – suggesting that popular nodes in a network tend to
become disproportionally more central than less popular nodes – creating scale-free
networks characterised by power-laws.44 Hence, simply by describing the diversity in
the global climate regime complex, and placing it in a complex systems framework,
40 Page (2015), at 35.
41 Bulkeley et al. (2014).
42
12 themes x 7 zones.
43 Page (2015), at 34–35.
44 Barabási & Albert (1999).
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we allow for new hypotheses to be generated around the structure of global
governance by borrowing concepts from complexity theory.
3.3.2 Interconnectedness
Emergent properties of a complex system can only be understood when analysing
the interactions among the system’s diverse entities. Entities (agents) interact with
each other in a networked structure, allowing for non-linear and recursive behaviour
to appear. Hence, to understand interaction in complex systems, we need to
describe the structure in which the interaction occurs. Starting with the eighty-
nine institutions presented in the previously mentioned governance triangle (see
Figure 3.1), we have identified two different types of interlinkages – shared members
and hyperlinks between homepages – as proxies for interaction.
A membership network is created by connecting those institutions that share
members.45 For example, if the Netherlands is a member to the UNFCCC and
the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), then a link is
created between the UNFCCC and REEEP. Figure 3.2 depicts the full member-
ship network representing eighty institutions since nine institutions do not share
members with other institutions. The nodes are coloured by zone (see also govern-
ance triangle in Figure 3.1).
The membership network illustrates the intricate structure of the climate govern-
ance complex, as well as how the institutions are by no means ‘governance islands’
working in isolation from each other, but are in fact quite densely connected across
zones in the governance triangle. A particularly dense cluster appears around those
institutions with public members, primarily states, such as the UNFCCC, CIF and
IRENA. The membership network also shows signs of ‘small-worldliness’46 with a
high clustering coefficient and small average path length compared to random
graphs.47 Small-world network topologies can have a range of implications on the
system such as the speed of contagion in the network, something which could
become important when trying to spread ideas, know-how and information.
The second network connects institutions via hyperlinks. Nearly all institutions in
the CONNECT dataset have dedicated homepages providing different types of
information, including embedded hyperlinks referring to other institutions and
organisations. By linking in this cyberspace, institutions and organisations reveal
existing or desired virtual connections. For instance, if an institution links to the
UNFCCC homepage on its site, it may consider information on the UNFCCC
homepage relevant for its own members and participants. Hyperlink Network
45 See also Widerberg (2016).
46 Watts & Strogatz (1998).
47 The statistics for the random graph were produced taking averages of a 1000 Erdos-Renyi
model-runs with the same node and edge count as the observed graph. Small-worldliness is
defined as Cactual / Crandom > 1 and Lactual / Lrandom  1.
58 Pattberg and Widerberg
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Analysis (HNA)48 and connecting institutions and organisations by homepages
creates what have been referred to as Virtual Policy Networks (VPNs),49 which are
defined as web-based issue networks.50 VPNs reflect the purposeful behaviour of
one institution’s attempt to publish information online and linking it to other
institutions.51
In the context of complexity and ‘interconnectedness’, we are interested in the
degree to which institutions connect to each other in cyberspace. To this end, an
‘inter-actor’ analysis has been conducted using Issue Crawler,52 which requires a
node to connect to another node from the list of starting points in order to be
admitted to the network. As starting points, the homepages of the eighty-nine insti-
tutions in the CONNECT dataset have been used and tested at different depth, i.e.
at how many iterations the harvesting of hyperlinks are carried out.53 At the most
conservative depth (1), only one iteration is performed collecting all the links at the
sites of the starting homepages and checked for inter-actorness.




50 McNutt (2012); McNutt & Pal (2011).
51 McNutt (2012).
52 Rogers (2010).
53 Issuecrawler’s instruction page provides a short explanation of crawl depth: ‘The pages fetched
from the starting point URLs are considered to be depth 0. The pages fetched from URL links
from those pages are considered to be depth 1. In general, the pages found from URL links on a
page of depth N are considered to be depth N+1. If you set a depth of 2, then no pages of depth
2 will be fetched. Only pages of depth 0 and 1 will be fetched (i.e. two levels of depth)’ (www
.govcom.org/Issuecrawler_instructions.htm).
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The hyperlink network reaffirms the results in the membership and thematic
networks of a highly dense and interlinked structure.54 It suggests that institutions
are actively engaging in trying to link with other institutions in the network,
strengthening the observation that contemporary global climate governance is
exercised in an intricate interaction structure.
The meaning behind linking homepages could be manifold. Homepages are
places for institutions to send information to potential participants and users, and
opportunities to show support or cooperation with other institutions. For instance,
patterns in inward linking suggest that the system favours a few central hubs in terms
of information and authority. Patterns in outward linking suggest that some insti-
tutions are trying to increase their own prestige and relevance by associating with
certain institutions.
3.3.3 Behavioural (Inter)dependence
In networks, agents depend on the flows of resources, knowledge and norms. For
instance, Kim55 shows how nearly 750 multilateral environmental agreements
connect in an increasingly interconnected dynamic network by referring to each
other in the negotiated text. His findings suggest that the global body of international
environmental law, in the absence of hierarchical coordination, has been self-
organising into a ‘mature’ complex system.56 Similarly, Green57 has reported similar
findings when linking private and public carbon accounting standards, revealing a
hierarchical pattern in private accounting standards ‘anchoring’ to public inter-
national carbon accounting standards. Her findings show how agents create emer-
gent behaviour in a system where different standards both compete and cooperate to
carve out a niche.58 The very concept of ‘networked governance’, contrasted against
hierarchical or market governance, relies on these flows between agents and emer-
gent interdependencies.
Within the CONNECT project, we have identified the central institutions that
hold key positions in the network and therefore influence the flow of resources,
knowledge and norms, thus creating forms of dependence. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show
two different measurements for identifying central institutions in the climate gov-
ernance regime complex.
Figure 3.4 shows the centrality of institutions (highlighted in black) in terms of
degree. Degree centrality is an indicator for institutions that have the most ‘friends’.
For flow of resources, however, an alternative measurement for centrality is more
interesting, namely ‘betweenness’. Betweenness centrality is an indicator for
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institutions that are located between other institutions, having the possibility to act as
gate-keepers for steering different flows. The behaviour of these institutions is thus in
theory extremely important for ensuring efficient transfers of whatever that travels
through the network. In Figure 3.5, the ten nodes with the highest betweenness
centrality are highlighted in black. While there is some overlap between institutions
with a high degree centrality and a high betweenness centrality, we find some nodes
that only become important as potential gate-keepers.
The exercise in testing different measurement for centrality shows how the
structural position of institutions becomes important when thinking of global gov-
ernance in terms of complex systems and networks. In Figure 3.5, for example, we
find that the institutions with the highest betweenness centrality are not inter-
national institutions such as the UNFCCC, but are rather those such as ICAP
and REEEP, hybrid institutions that connect international and transnational
institutions and public and private actors. These nodes are thus in theory important
gate-keepers for the flow of resources, information and norms between – in particu-
lar – state and non-state actors.
3.3.4 Openness
As the fourth and final criterion for evaluating whether or not global climate change
governance constitutes a complex system, we employ the idea of openness, meaning
that a complex system should be interacting with its systemic environment (i.e. all
other systems around it). Different from our approaches in Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4,
openness cannot easily be measured in a quantitative way. Rather, we use qualitative
data to illustrate that climate change indeed is an open system. Our main argument
here is that the climate governance system is routinely interacting with other
governance systems, exchanging resources, information and actors. Examples
include governance in other policy fields that interacts with the climate change
domain, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer
(as some Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODS) are also greenhouse gases), and
climate change governance impacting on other policy domains, such as the UN
REDD process and its relation to forest governance. A recent study on the insti-
tutional nexus between global biodiversity governance and other environmental
policy fields59 has shown that, for example, out of 385 institutions governing
climate change, agriculture, fisheries and forests, 108 institutions also have
governance functions related to biodiversity. Similar studies on the Sustainable
Development Goals have shown that the seventeen individual goals are con-
nected by both bio-physical links and institutional interactions.60 In sum, the
climate change governance architecture is not only rich with internal
59 Pattberg, Kristensen & Widerberg (2017).
60 Boas, Biermann & Kanie (2016); Nilsson, Griggs & Visbeck (2016).
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interactions and behavioural linkages (Sections 3.3.1–3.3.3) but also with linkages
to other policy fields, both environmental and non-environmental.
3.4 implications for smart mixes and the way forward
This chapter has argued that learning from complexity theory offers new insights
into the system of global environmental governance. In fact, we have attempted to
demonstrate that some global governance systems, in this case the global climate
governance architecture, are complex systems and can therefore be analysed from a
complexity perspective.
Concluding that the current climate change governance architecture displays
properties of a complex system has at least three important implications for the idea
of ‘smart mixes’. First, following from the insight that in complex systems the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, studying individual governance arrangements and
ideal-types is insufficient for understanding the actual behaviour of the evolving
regime complex. Instead, actors and interactions must be studied taking their
broader environment, context and position within an interaction network into
account. In this chapter, we have illustrated how mapping a governance system
using network-based approaches could help research further in positioning events in
their broader contexts.
Second, since non-linear behaviour is the rule rather than the exception, complex
systems need different evaluation criteria than simple or complicated systems. Using
concepts from complexity theory to open up the ‘black box’ between input and
impacts of interventions in a policy field – for instance, by using complex program
theory61 – could improve our understanding of observed social change or how to
more effectively reach governance goals.62 For example, conventional linear think-
ing on how to bring about change is challenged if we understand outcomes as
emergent rather than being planned, or the functioning of feedback loops in social
systems to create large changes with small means.
And third, and related to the previous point, a complex systems perspective calls into
question overly positive expectations about orchestration and the ability of actors to
influence the system in a linear-causal way. While individual cooperative initiatives in
the climate change policy field might well be considered as ‘orchestrated’, the overall
system is not the result of rational planning. Feedbacks and unintended consequences
(both positive and negative) undermine the linear-consequential ontology of orchestra-
tion. From this vantage point, the question of smart mixes is a relevant ex ante
evaluation but less important in the design or planning phase.
Finally, we see in particular three areas for future research. First, efforts should be
made to better measure and explain varying degrees of complexity across various
61 Rogers (2008).
62 Stame (2004).
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issue areas and policy domains in a comparative perspective. Understanding govern-
ance systems as complex systems allows for a unified theoretical perspective on
seemingly disparate phenomena in world politics, from migration to climate
change, the financial system and sustainable development. A second challenge
and research opportunity lies in modelling complex governance systems. The
guiding question here is whether we can foresee (within certain margins of uncer-
tainty) the evolution of complex governance systems. For example, would we rather
expect increased synergies and integration, or fragmentation and welfare losses? This
means that we make a step closer to modelling smart mixes as an outcome of
complex systems. And third, we should make more efforts to accommodate failure
into our theorising. Complexity theory could be used to better understand govern-
ance failures as well as adaptive behaviour of governance systems. From this
perspective, designing smart mixes is not so much rational planning as constant
experimenting, failing, adapting and learning. We hope that a complexity perspec-
tive can help to balance overly optimistic and technical approaches towards plan-
ning policy interventions.
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